I primarily use this blog to discuss some of my ideas about certain issues in philosophy of mind and metaphysics. All comments are welcome!
I am a PhD student in philosophy at Humboldt University in Berlin and a visiting PhD student at King's College London. I am near completion of my dissertation. My main interest lies in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. I do a research on the ways in which tremendous evidence from the empirical study of phenomenal consciousness can help us to explain away brute disagreement about intuitions that underlie key philosophical problems such as the explanatory gap. The set of intuitions that I deal with stem from the conceivability arguments and the epistemic gap accounts. My idea is that these arguments fail to establish their conclusions without invoking some tacit additional assumptions about modes of presentation in the conceptual semantics. I argue that that these varied assumptions, in fact, reflect a brute disagreement of intuitions which cannot be resolved by further arguments, but by using a quality space model to analyze the structure of relations among psychological concepts, phenomenal concepts, folk psychological concepts, etc. My hypothesis is that the quality space model can be constructed for any kind of phenomenal experience (pain, visual perception, emotion, auditory experience, etc.).